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Power-sharing or Ethnic Domination? Ethnic Representation in the 
Republics of Russia in the Late 2000s - Early 2010s 
Konstantin Zamyatin* 
University of Helsinki   
 
Abstract 
The paper explores political representation of the major ethnic groups in the 
republics of Russia, in order to elucidate the role of ethnicity in regional politics 
under an authoritarian turn in the late 2000s - early 2010s. To assess quantitative 
data, the study develops a model to analyse patterns of ethnic representation. The 
data analysis demonstrates that, at least in some republics, ethnicity was among the 
major principles in power distribution and regional regimes seem to have relied in 
managing diversity largely on either ethnic domination or on regional power-
sharing. Based on a structural approach, the structural factors that contributed to 
these outcomes are analysed, taking into account a range of variables that 
characterize the ethnic situations of the republics and their political regimes. The 
findings of this study point at the persistence of ethnic representation as a practice in 
the formation of the republics’ officialdoms under the authoritarian regime. 
 
Keywords: ethnic representation; power-sharing; ethnic domination; ethnic republics; Russian 
Federation  
 
 
Following the parade of sovereignties, 21 republics, 10 autonomous districts and an 
autonomous region were established as forms of territorial self-governance of their ‘titular 
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nation(alitie)s’ alongside regular (‘non-ethnic’) federation units in the early 1990s (Zamyatin, 
2016: 25-27). ‘Titular’ ethnic elites became dominant in the leadership of many republics. The 
recentralization of the 2000s reduced the republics’ autonomy and by the 2010s resulted in the 
demise of federalism. Did ‘titular’ elites still remain dominant in the republics? To shed light 
on the access of elites to power in ethnic republics of Russia in the late 2000s – early 2010s, 
this study aims at quantitatively assessing the level of ethnic representation in the republics’ top 
officialdom.  
The period of the late 2000s – early 2010s is interesting for study, because substitution of 
the last Yeltsin-era heavy-weight heads of republics with the new ones in 2010 had its impact 
also on power distribution in republics without significantly disturbing the equilibrium in ethnic 
representation. Since autumn 2015, several heads of republics were arrested during the 
anticorruption campaign or otherwise sacked and substituted for ‘outsiders’, which might have 
marked a new era in regional ethnopolitics, when the role of ethnicity as a consideration in 
appointments diminished. In this study, the ruling groups that are under exploration are those 
that occupied formal positions in the 2007/2011-2011/2015 electoral cycle: the precise years 
vary among the republics.  
What patterns of ethnic representation emerged in the republics? In the first part, the paper 
will present the data of a comparative study of ethnic representation across republics. Hanna 
Pitkin identified among the dimensions of political representation descriptive and substantive 
representation (Pitkin, 1967). This study assesses ethnic representation operationalized as a 
‘descriptive representation’, when the ethnic identity of public officials and politicians is taken 
as an indicator of representation that substitutes their standing for the group interests. The 
assessment of substantial representation, when the representatives also act in relation to 
particular interests of an ethnic group, is not taken in the scope of this study, inter alia, because 
the analysis does not focus on the outcomes of the political process, such as passing legislation 
on ethnic issues.  
In focus of the analysis is the contrast between the shares of the titular and the Russian 
populations and their representation in the parliaments and governments of the republics. I will 
use the combination of positional and biographical approaches of the elite theory to study the 
information on ethnic background of elected deputies and government officials attainable in 
open sources and available expert reports. An unavoidable shortcoming of the option of 
studying descriptive representation is that only a probabilistic argument can be made, because 
the representatives may act only out of their own interests, as portrayed in instrumentalist 
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accounts. Further, given the context-specific character of ethnic allegiances, there is a danger 
of essentializing ethnicity by overstating the deepness of ethnic cleavages and divisions among 
the elites and in the populations.  
For many ethnic groups in Russia, social cohesion is enhanced by the processes of 
assimilation that make ethnic identities less salient and the issue of ethnic representation less 
relevant. Ethnic issues were central to the political agenda only in some republics and often 
only at the time of major events, such as the adoption of their constitutions, but also then ethnic 
elites rarely acted as a consolidated force. More often, regional elites competed and reached a 
coalition of the second-order sub-elite groups or even ‘clans’, where ethnicity was one among 
the binding principles (Salagaev and Sergeev, 2013). Usually the divide between ‘titular’ and 
‘Russian’ segments of regional elites had less political salience than their belonging to the ‘party 
of power’ united under the regional leader. In this study, the different segments of regional 
political elites that acted as ‘representatives of their people’, proposing their solutions to ethnic 
and linguistic issues at the time of critical junctures, are conventionally referred to, accordingly, 
as ‘titular elites’ vs ‘Russian (regional) elites’ (Zamyatin, 2015: 352).  
The study will develop a model to systematize and analyse the patterns of representation 
and hypothesize about the state of ethnic relations in individual republics that these data reveal. 
Throughout the post-Soviet period, Russia pursued a combination of approaches to diversity 
management, but since the 2010s there was a clear shift in the predominant strategy from 
accommodation to integration and assimilation (Zamyatin, 2016: 43-44). Ethnic republics 
themselves are the pillar of the accommodationist approach. Russia’s federal design 
significantly restricted their jurisdiction to manage diversity through the creation of the political 
institutions based on ethnicity, but up to the 2010s the Kremlin rarely interfered directly into 
regional ethnic politics.  
Thus, the republics settled the issue of ethnic representation at the level of informal 
practices, which makes categorization difficult. In Russian public discourse, the phenomena of 
varying ‘regional approaches to diversity management’ remains unnamed. Many elite members 
themselves continue to share essentialist beliefs about ethnic identities that are implicit in the 
vocabulary of political discourse. As part of the nationalist rhetoric, some politicians 
characterized the overrepresentation of the titular elites in republics as ‘ethnocracy’. This 
concept is ideologically charged and faulty in semantics: the substitution of ‘demos’ with 
‘ethnos’ does not work, because of the central role of elites in regional politics.  
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I will hypothesize about regional approaches based only on the analysis of the quantitative 
data and will not qualitatively substantiate the conceptualization, which remains a matter for 
further research. I will not invent new categories but, instead, will employ with some 
qualifications the existing terms like ‘minority inclusion’, ‘power-sharing’ or ‘domination’ for 
designating the approaches not as normative but only as descriptive categories (for a similar 
classification of forms of minority representation see Bieber, 2010).  
Power-sharing and domination are the opposite approaches, while inclusion is a category 
to depict in-between cases. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the first is a 
democratic and the second an authoritarian approach. The most famous form of power-sharing 
that was proposed as a democratic strategy of conflict resolution in an ethnically divided society 
is consociationalism developed by Arend Lijphart (1977). However, authoritarian regimes also 
rely on power-sharing to ensure their stability. Similarly, domination is pursued both under the 
democratic and authoritarian rule (McGarry, 2010: 37). Further, the approaches have both a 
vertical dimension in the context of the centre-periphery relations and a horizontal dimension 
in regional politics. I will only study the horizontal non-institutionalized arrangements in 
republics that amounted to domination or tacit agreements that envisaged regional executive 
power-sharing (O’Leary, 2008; Bieber, 2010). 
Why might certain patterns of ethnic representation have emerged? From the 
constructivist perspective, ‘instrumentalist’ thinkers see interests and human agency as the 
driving force of identity construction, and ‘institutionalists’ argue that the social structures 
create identities. Arguably, the agency factors are more characteristic of the Russian 
ethnopolitics in the periods of the 1990s and 2000s, when the role of ethnic mobilization and 
‘ethnic entrepreneurship’ was decreasing with the progress of the state-building from its stages 
of sovereignization and decentralization to recentralization, while the establishment of 
superpresidentialism also in the republics conditioned their specific of party politics and ethnic 
voting, intra-elite competition and network effects. Thus, structural factors are crucial for study 
of regional ethnopolitics in the period of the late 2000s – early 2010s.  
Hence, in the second part, the paper will analyse the data patterns based on the cleavage 
structure theory that seeks to explain political outcomes by the character of identity divisions 
in society, whether the population is divided into complementary or cross-cut identity groups. 
Cross-cutting cleavages are said to enhance social cohesion and reinforcing cleavages 
contributes to the political salience of ethnic identities, producing more segmented societies 
(Lijphart, 1977; Horowitz, 1985). The study will explore how the levels of ethnic representation 
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depended on some structural variables that characterize the ethnic situations of the republics 
and their political regimes. A low level of political competition largely contributed to 
domination, and a higher competition contributed to power-sharing. 
 
1. Ethnicity and representation  
1.1 Approaches and difficulties in studying representation  
In the early 2000s, the Kremlin started ‘federal reforms’ that aimed at the recentralization of 
the state through building the ‘vertical of power’ and resulted in a decline of federalism in 
Russia. The ‘institutionalist’ understanding that the existence of ‘ethnic institutions’, such as 
the republics themselves, reinforces alternative ethno-national identities justified the 
accompanying nation-building efforts. The depoliticization of ethnicity and its removal from 
the public domain included the abolishment or at least deformalization of the professional 
requirements of language knowledge and other ethnic institutions (Zamyatin, 2016: 36-38). 
While indication of one’s ethnic self-identification was preserved in the population censuses, 
the practice of official monitoring of the data on ethnic identity in virtually all other public 
contexts was stopped. Nevertheless, as will be shown below, the relevance of ethnicity in the 
political context persists, although it varies from one republic to another. By definition, a blind 
spot of the institutionalist approach in studying ethnic phenomena is that it does not provide 
tools to explore informal practices in ‘cadre policy’.  
How is it still possible to study the ethnicity of members of the ruling groups? In general, 
the data on the ethnic background of the first figures in the regions is typically publicly known. 
So is the data on ethnicity of the second, third and fourth positions of government head, 
chairman of legislature and mayor of the capital city. In part of executive officials and civil 
servants, the data on ethnic representation in individual republics and other regions is often 
collected by the authorities, but rarely disclosed, because, especially since the 2000s, it is 
viewed as politically sensitive and potentially inhibiting for ‘inter-ethnic accord’. When 
accessible, practically no sources give a systematic set of data that could be used for 
comparisons across regions. The compilation of the dataset is the practical task of the current 
study. 
A further complication is that the 1990s were characterized by a frequent change of 
regional leadership, with the exception of some heads of the republics in power for over two 
decades until mid-2000s up to 2010. At the lower stories of the apparatus, regular change of 
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deputies after serving their terms and the rotation of government officials, especially among the 
ministers, was also typical. It would be possible to produce a meaningful set of data for any 
given moment but not a dynamic picture which would be patchy by the lack of similarity in 
data. It makes more sense to go beyond everyday politics and give a snapshot of the recent 
situation and then to interpret the patterns from a long-time perspective.  
Similarly, representation assessed solely by one’s formal position in the institutional 
structure incompletely stands for one’s political clout, because the importance of informal 
power networks grew over time behind the façade of institutions. Nevertheless, this is a 
sufficient indicator for the purpose of this study which is based on the assumption that ethnic 
segments of elites were similarly represented in formal and informal networks.  
The distinction between formal and informal ethnic representation is meaningful also 
because typically domination was camouflaged by the appointment of at least some minority 
representatives to formal positions to emphasize the political representativeness and 
responsiveness of the ruling groups even if in reality domination was sustained, often through 
informal channels. At the same time, informal networks could enhance ethnic representation 
because these included trusted persons from one’s earlier career stages. For example, for titular 
representatives these were often rural career paths. This study did not take the task of following 
this distinction because some fluctuation in representation creates noise in the data but does not 
disrupt the patterns that tended to be at the margins of the scale ending either in domination or 
power-sharing. A more nuanced approach to reveal the layers of formal and informal ethnic 
representation remains a topic for further research. 
 
1.2 Methods and focus groups 
One method that provides a shortcut for a first approximation of ethnic representation in an 
authoritarian situation is to focus on studying the ethnic background of the chief executives. 
However, the balanced appointment practice was often preserved also under the strong 
presidencies at the lower stories of the state apparatus. Thus, another method is to identify the 
ethnic background of members of the ruling groups, including regional parliamentarians, heads 
of regional executive authorities, and sometimes also heads of municipalities. While 
parliamentarians are usually under public scrutiny, less available in open sources is the data on 
ethnicity of the other two categories of public officials.  
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A further complication regarding heads of executive authorities and agencies is whether 
one should focus exclusively on the study of the ethnic background of the prime-minister and 
ministers or also on deputy prime-ministers and deputy ministers as well as heads of 
governmental agencies. A wider focus would make sense, because the latter categories qualify 
as ‘leading officials’ and, thus, members of the ruling groups. When forming the regional 
government and ministries, the principle of proportional representation of the major groups is 
often observed along other considerations. For example, posts of minister and first deputy 
minister would be shared between individuals representing the largest groups. Another 
advantage of a wider focus is that this way the cluster of the executive branch would be roughly 
of the same size as that for the legislature, which, according to the 2010 federal law, had to be 
standardized across the regions in the following electoral cycle. Thus, a wider focus would have 
made comparisons more consistent. 
However, deputy prime-ministers and deputy ministers are a much less public group and 
their ethnic background is often not disclosed, which makes a cross-regional study near to 
impossible. In addition, the cabinet as a collected body includes only heads of executive 
authorities. Heads of executive authorities and their deputies do not have equal standing, and 
in some places the ethnic background of the heads of authorities might be a sufficient indicator 
representing the lower stories, also because in some contexts s/he might hire a team consisting 
of co-ethnics. Further, a significant part among the regional government members are heads of 
branches of the federal authorities, including law-enforcement agencies, where proportionality 
is far less observed by default due to their rotation from other regions and members of the titular 
group are typically less represented. The same is valid in regard to the judicial authorities that 
are in the federal competence and, thus, not in the focus of this study.  
A study focus on an ethnic background of municipal elites would have made sense, 
because this level is the closest to the population and governing bodies tend to resemble its 
ethnic composition the most. Regional capital cities are typically well-to-do entities and have 
the bulk of the regional population. For that reason, some sources list head of capital city among 
the first officials of republics. Titular populations in some republics traditionally reside in rural 
areas, while the Russians often are in the majority in the capital city. However, the factual 
subordination of municipalities to regional authorities signified a virtual lack of local self-
government. Thus, a mechanic summation of municipal elites with other regional elites 
misrepresents the overall structure of the ruling groups in these republics.  
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The second method is suitable for exploring the balance of power both under democratic 
conditions with its representation of many group interests, and under an authoritarian regime, 
because the principle of ethnic representation tends to be proliferated from chief executives 
downwards to the level of heads and deputy heads in the executive branch, and often even 
among the public servants. In practice, this study produces data on two dozen ministers in some 
republics and the data on three or four dozen ministers and heads of government agencies (when 
available, also their deputies) in some other republics. Despite this varying volume, the shares 
are comparable, because ethnic representation does not presumably differ in ministries and 
government agencies. Thus, this study uses the combination of the two methods. 
 
1.3 Sources and the data on ethnic representation  
The major source of the data are reports of regional experts based on open sources and available 
from publications of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology of the Russian Academy of 
Sciences. A semi-official source (Romanov and Stepanov, 2013) is the closest there is to a 
systematized set, but the method is not explained, only shares are given and no raw data is 
presented to cross-check the calculation. The publication lopsidedly tends to underestimate the 
share of ethnic Russians among the elites, overemphasizing titular overrepresentation, but 
interprets overrepresentation of the Russian elites as a natural order of things. It is not explicitly 
stated which segment was included into the ruling group in focus, but one can deduce that these 
were regional parliamentarians, ministers and heads of municipalities. For example, analysing 
the data on ethnic background of the ruling group of Tatarstan, three clusters of elites were 
given and, inter alia, 24% of ethnic Russians were marked among parliamentarians. This is 
outdated data, as the accurate data on the number of ethnic Russian parliamentarians in 
Tatarstan for the period should be 32% (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2013b: 87).  
The data for the republics of the North Caucasus Federal District originate mostly from 
Tishkov and Stepanov (2013a), for Chechnya and Ingushetia from Kosikov (2012) and for 
Kabardin-Balkaria from Tishkov and Stepanov (2010) and Tenov and Atlaskirov (2014). The 
data on the two republics of the Southern Federal District originate for Adygea after the 2006 
elections from Golosov (2012) and Ivanov (2007) and for Kalmykia from Ulinova (2011). Only 
the data on deputies of the republics of the Volga and North-Western Federal Districts are 
available for Bashkortostan and Tatarstan from Tishkov and Stepanov (2013b), for Udmurtia 
from Tishkov and Stepanov (2013c), for Mari El from Zamyatin (2015), for Mordovia from my 
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analysis based on official data, and only on titular deputies for Komi from Tishkov and 
Stepanov (2009) and for Karelia from the data officially presented at the 7th Congress of the 
Karelian People (2013). The data on Chuvashia, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan are discussed in 
the next section. For the lack of other data, the unreliable aggregated data from Romanov and 
Stepanov (2013) is used on the share of the ethnic Russians among the ruling groups in 
Udmurtia, Mari El, Mordovia and Bashkortostan. The available data on the republics of the Far 
East and Siberian Federal Districts are for Buryatia, Sakha (Yakutia) and Tuva from Ochirova 
(2011) and for Khakassia and Altay from Ivanov (2007).  
The accumulated data set on the numbers of individuals in power positions by their 
ethnicity is presented in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. The numbers of individuals by their ethnicity in the republics’ parliaments and 
governments.  
 
1) North 
Caucasus 
2) 
total 
3) 
titular 
4) 
Russian 
5) 
3rd 
1) Europe-
an part 
2)  3)  4) 5)  1) Siberia/ 
Far East 
2)  3)  4) 5)  
Adygea 
2006/2007 
% 
% 
% 
% 
n/a 
% 
- 
- 
Karelia 
2011 
50 
n/a 
8 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
- 
- 
Khakassia 
2007 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
- 
- 
Kalmykia 
2011 
23 
20 
18 
12 
4 
8 
- 
- 
Komi 
2007 
30 
n/a 
6 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
- 
- 
Altay 
2007 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
- 
- 
KChR 
2009 
72 
% 
37 
% 
17 
% 
11 
% 
Udmurtia 
2012 
90 
% 
13 
% 
67 
% 
7 
- 
Buryatia 
2007 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
- 
- 
KBR+ 
2009/2012 
72 
% 
39 
% 
15 
% 
15 
% 
Mari El 
2009 
52 
% 
15 
% 
29 
% 
1 
- 
Sakha (Y) 
2008 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
- 
- 
N. Ossetia  
2009 
70 
31 
61 
26 
7 
4 
- 
- 
Mordovia 
2007/2009 
51 
% 
11 
% 
32 
% 
4 
- 
Tuva 
2006 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
% 
- 
- 
Dagestan 
2010 
90 
25 
27 
6 
n/a 
3 
14 
4 
Bashkorto 
stan 2008 
% 
38 
% 
21 
% 
12 
% 
2 
     
Chechnya 
2011 
41 
30 
n/a 
n/a  
2 
1 
- 
- 
Chuvashia 
2011 
47 
21 
35 
19 
12 
2 
- 
- 
     
Ingushetia 
2011 
27 
18 
n/a  
n/a  
1  
0 
- 
- 
Tatarstan 
2009/2010 
98 
29 
67 
27 
31 
2 
- 
- 
     
 
Note: 1) In the first column, the republic’s title is given together with the first year of the 
parliament work and the year for the government. In addition, a separate year for the 
government is given, if noticeably different. The republics are concentrated in three large 
geographical areas: the Volga-Ural Region and the European North, the North Caucasus and 
nearby, and Siberia and the Far East, and are grouped accordingly.  
2) The data on the total numbers of regional parliamentarians and government members is 
presented, accordingly, as the first and second digits in the column for each republic. When 
only relative data on the corresponding shares of titular and Russian elites is available in 
sources, the field in marked with ‘%’ and the corresponding data is provided in Table 2. 
3) The data on the numbers of parliamentarians and government members of the titular ethnic 
background.  
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4) The respective data on those of the Russian ethnic background.  
5) The respective data for the third largest group, if applicable.  
 
To what extent is the representation proportional and does any elite group control half or more 
of the offices? The data on the shares of the largest ethnic groups in power is presented in Table 
2 and is counted as a simple average of the shares in two bodies, because the government as a 
collective body is at least as powerful as the legislature. Many republics have more than two 
main ethnic groups, sometimes also more than two titular groups. For the purpose of simplicity 
and availability, the third groups are not in the focus of this study and are discussed only briefly. 
 
Table 2. The shares of the largest ethnic groups in the republics’ total population (2010 
population census) and the republics’ officialdoms.  
 
 
Note: 1) In the first column, together with the republic’s title, the ratio of over- or 
underrepresentation is given (%) (see the next sections and Table 3 for the calculation method).  
2) The shares of the titular and Russian groups in the total population (%) are presented 
according to the data of the 2010 population census (also the third largest group, if applicable; 
presented, accordingly, as the first, second and, possibly, third and fourth digits in the column 
for each republic). Apparently underrated data of Romanov and Stepanov on the ethnic 
Russians among the elites in the Volga-Urals republics are given in italics. Available less 
1) North 
Caucasus 
2)  3)  4) 5)  1) Europe-
an part 
2)  3)  4) 5)  1) Siberia/ 
Far East 
2)  3)  4) 5)  
Adygea 
+35 
25 
62 
51 
44 
47 
46 
56 
43 
Karelia 7.4 
82 
n/a 
 
16 
n/a 
n/a 
 
Khakassia 
 
12 
82 
10 
81 
15 
79 
6 
83 
Kalmykia 
+13 
57 
30 
69 
29 
78 
17 
60
40 
Komi 
+5 
24 
65 
n/a 
 
20 
n/a 
n/a 
 
Altay 
-2 
34 
57 
35 
53 
35 
56 
36 
50 
Karachay-
Cherkessia 
+24  
41 
32 
12 
50 
25 
12 
51 
23 
15 
49 
27 
9 
Udmurtia 
+58 
28
62 
7 
n/a 
78 
14
74 
8 
n/a Buryatia 
-25 
30 
66 
45 
48 
 
46 
48 
43 
47 
Kabardin-
Balkaria 
+3 
57 
23 
13 
52 
20 
23 
54 
21 
21 
50 
19 
25 
Mari El 
+48 
44
47 
6 
n/a 
68 
28
56 
2 
n/a Sakha 
(Yakutia) 
+16 
50 
38 
58 
33 
 
57 
35 
58 
29 
North 
Ossetia  
+54 
65 
21 
85 
11 
 
87 
10 
84 
13 
Mordovia 
-2 
40
53 
5 
n/a 
52  
 
22 
63 
8 
n/a Tuva 
 
 
82 
16 
72 
23 
 
78 
19 
66 
28 
Dagestan 
0 
 
29 
3.6 
17 
15 
13 
27 
7.3 
16 
13  
12 
30 
2.2 
16 
14 
12 
24 
12 
16 
12 
12 
Bashkorto 
stan 
+29 
30
36 
25 
50 
32 
45
32 
27 
55 
32 
     
Chechnya 
 
95 
1.9 
n/a 
4.3  
n/a 
5.2 
n/a 
3.3 
Chuvashia 
+39 
68
27 
82 
16 
74 
23 
91 
9 
     
Ingushetia 
 
94 
0.8 
n/a  
2  
n/a  
4 
n/a  
0 
Tatarstan 
+47 
53
40 
76 
23 
66
32 
86 
14 
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consistent data on other periods for Adygea, Altay, Khakassia and Mordovia are also given in 
italics. 
3) The shares of the titular and Russian elites among the ruling groups (%) are calculated as a 
simple average of their representation in parliaments and governments.  
4) The data on parliamentarians (%) are calculated based on the same sources. 
5) The data on government members (%) are calculated based on the same sources. 
 
What does the data mean? The data presents a continuum of cases that, nevertheless, can be 
clustered in certain patterns. If the share of elite segments among the ruling groups is the 
function of the share of an ethnic group in the total population, then an ethnic group is either 
overrepresented and, accordingly, another group is underrepresented, or groups enjoy 
proportional representation.  
 
1.4 Model for assessment of representation patterns  
How can one convert quantitative relations of representation into power relations for the 
purpose of interpretation of approaches to diversity management? As these are relations, they 
should be qualified accordingly and not in absolute terms. A scale is needed to measure against. 
A model is proposed to qualitatively assess the representation patterns according to the shares 
of elite segments among the ruling group in relation to the size of the groups they are supposed 
to represent. This study uses an analytical tool that distinguishes the levels of representation 
along the scale from ‘power-sharing’, to ‘inclusion’, ‘domination’ and ‘exclusion’; transitional 
cases and third-group cases are discussed separately.   
1) In a hypothetical situation with two equally sized ethnic groups in a divided society, a 
50%-50% paritarian relation among the members of the ruling groups according to their ethnic 
background would designate a complete proportional representation of their elites and the 
groups. A 100%-0% relation would designate a complete exclusion of one group and its elite. 
In a 75%-25% relation, everything above 75% could be conventionally designated as power-
sharing and everything below 25% as exclusion. The interval between 75% and 50% could be 
designated as inclusion and between 50% and 25% as domination. The numbers in the 75%-
25% relation were taken solely for the sake of round numbers, because in reality a higher share 
than 75% may be required for a situation to qualify as power-sharing and a lower share than 
25% for exclusion. 
2) In reality, the groups are never equal in size, so the standard scheme should be modified 
to reflect this fact. The modified model differs in comparison with the standard one outlined 
above in that the calculations are made based on the actual share of the groups. For example, in 
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a hypothetical situation when the shares of two groups in the total population relates as 60% 
and 40%, the larger group would be proportionally represented, if its elite has 60% of all seats, 
share power having 45-70% (taking up to a quarter of the share of the other group or giving it 
up to a quarter from the own share in comparison to proportional representation), include with 
more than 70%, dominate with more than 80%, exclude with more than 90%, be included 
having under 45%, dominated with less than 30%, and excluded with less than 15% of all seats 
in each case. Similarly, the smaller group would be represented proportionally, if its elite has 
about 40% of all seats, share the power having 30-55%, include with more than 55%, dominate 
with more than 70%, exclude with more than 85%, be included having 20-30%, dominated with 
less than 20%, and excluded with less than 10%.  
The modified model should be applied to the interval of the cases ranging from the one 
when groups are nearly equal in size to one when one group is up to three times larger than the 
other. The model should not be applied to the situation when one group is more than three times 
larger, that is, constitutes an absolute majority of more than 75% of the population in a republic 
and its share in the ruling group is also more than 75%. This situation should be characterized 
as domination despite possible inclusion of the minority elite.  
3) In reality, there are always third groups, which are likely to ally with larger groups. It 
cannot be predicted in the model with which of the larger groups they would form coalition. 
Ukrainians and Belarusians are likely to ally with Russian and other minority groups with the 
titular groups. In the model, it could be assumed that the common influence of the third groups 
will be zero because they will nullify each other. Hence, in case the third groups are relatively 
small in size, representation for the two largest groups can be assessed by applying a modified 
model as if these were the only groups (calculating them together as 100%). In case a third 
group is nearly equally sized or is otherwise significant in numbers and (or) in status (for 
example, is a titular or indigenous group), representation can be assessed in the same way as in 
the standard model, only for three and more groups. The actual impact of the third group(s) 
should be then assessed qualitatively in case studies of regions. 
4) The application of the model produces a hypothetical assessment that should be 
qualitatively tested and interpreted. Conventionally, the divergence of up to 25% into the share 
of the other group is interpreted as indicating the mode of power-sharing, up to 50% inclusion 
and more than 50% that of domination. 
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1.5 Ethnic representation as an indicator of diversity management  
When the model is applied to assess the patterns on representation outlined above, the following 
matrix on the ratio of over- or underrepresentation of the elites and the corresponding 
approaches to diversity management in republics appears (see Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Ratio of overrepresentation and the approaches to diversity management.  
 
1) group 
prevails  
2)  
power-
sharing 
3)  
ti- 
me 
4)  
-25 
+25 
2) 
inclusion 
3) 
ti- 
me 
4) 
+25 
+50 
2)  
domination 
3) 
ti- 
me 
4) 
+50 
+75 
2) 
exclusi
on 
titular 
elites 
KChR  
Sakha (Y) 
Kalmykia  
KBR 
Dagestan  
1.3 
1.3 
1.92
.51.
7 
+24 
+16 
+13 
+3 
0 
Tatarstan 
Chuvashia 
Adygea  
Bashkor- 
tostan 
1.3 
2.5 
0.4 
0.8 
+47 
+39 
+35 
+29 
 
Ingushetia 
Chechnya 
Tuva  
North 
Ossetia 
99 
48 
5.1 
3.1 
 
 
 
+54 
 
Russian 
elites 
Buryatia 
Altay 
Mordovia 
Komi  
2.21
.7 
1.3 
2.7 
-25 
-2 
-2 
+5 
   
 
Mari El 
Udmurtia 
Khakassia 
Karelia 
1.1 
2.2 
6.8 
11 
+48 
+58 
 
 
 
 
Note: 1) One elite segment prevailed, and depending on whether this is a titular or Russian 
segment, the case is placed in the according box.  
2) Republics are placed in boxes depending on their approaches to diversity management 
assessed based on ethnic representation. Republics are listed in each box in sequence from the 
highest to the lowest ratio.  
3) The demographic relation of the adjusted sizes between the strongest and second strongest 
groups in the total population (by times). 
4) The ratio is not marked for the republics that are placed in boxes because of the presence of 
the absolute majority groups (in five and more times). Other republics are placed in boxes 
according to the ratio of over- or underrepresentation of their elites (%), except for one republic 
with the ratio at the margin that is, nonetheless, interpreted as domination (Mari El).  
 
The ratio is calculated as a discrepancy between a would-be proportional representation of the 
strongest ethnic group in the ruling group according to its share in the total population in the 
republic and the actual share of the elite segment in the ruling group. The shares are compared 
not based on raw data but adjusted for the two largest groups as if these were the only groups 
(also for the significant third and fourth group).  
For example, the popular shares of the two largest groups in Adygea of 25% and 62% 
are adjusted for the two groups as 29% and 71% (counted together not as 87% as in reality, but 
as 100%); similarly, the elite shares of 51% and 44% are adjusted for the two groups as 54% 
and 46% (counted together not as 95%, but as 100%). The discrepancy between the shares of 
the stronger group in the population and in the elite amounts to its over- or underrepresentation 
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and is recalculated in terms of its infringing on a would-be proportional representation of the 
other group. The ratio is then the relation that depicts the share that the stronger group has taken 
due to its overrepresentation (in the example, the proportional share of 29% is overrepresented 
by +25% with actual share of 54%) from a would-be proportional representation of the other 
group (+25% of 71% is +35% of 100%).  
In case calculations are based on incomplete data on the elite representation (estimations 
in italics), the adjusted share of the elite group is calculated based on adjustment of the largest 
groups as if they were the only groups in the total population, which impairs accuracy of the 
assessment. Apparently underrated data on the ethnic Russians among the elites in the Volga-
Ural republics were used first for calculation of the possible shares of titular elites also by the 
postulation that the adjusted common share of titular and Russian elites reflects their adjusted 
shares as presented for the total population. The ratio for Komi is assessed based on the share 
of titular elite in regional assembly for a lack of other data. In general, the data for the republics 
with power-sharing arrangements are more likely available than for those with domination, 
which could be outcomes of deliberate policies. 
 
2. Representation and diversity management  
2.1 Prevalence 
In this part, I will look further for regularities in the data on representation along a number of 
variables from some economic, cultural and identity structures: the correlation in the shares of 
the titular and Russian ethnic groups, possible presence of a third group or groups, ethnic 
cleavages, possible ethnic grievances and conflicts, and ethnic and social stratification. In the 
last section, I will also hypothesize about the impact of political structures.   
First of all, there are no paritarian cases, arguably, because these are possible only under 
formal arrangements. Further, it proved to be practically impossible also under power-sharing 
to secure an equal and proportional representation of the ethnic groups (Turovsky, 2010: 34-
35). Hence, one group always prevailed whatever the approach, as reflected in Table 3. 
‘Prevalence’ of one side is not a separate approach but an overarching feature of all approaches. 
An ethnic background of the head of the republic proved to be a good predictor of which 
ethnic segment of elite has an upper hand in a republic. The institutional design based on super-
presidentialism resulted in the prevalence of the strongest group. A super-presidential form of 
government in Russia proliferated also in the regions (Zamyatin, 2016: 44). The head of 
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republic is typically the strongest and often the only first-order political actor (Turovsky, 2010: 
33). Even if the post of the speaker of regional legislature or of the head of government typically 
receives a representative of the second strongest group, these positions are much weaker than 
that of the head of republic, and the elites often express their dissatisfaction with a lesser post.  
In the post-Soviet period, the tendency was the substitution of the heads of republics of 
the titular nationality with those of Russian origin. Up to the mid-1990s, the heads of all 
republics were of the titular nationality except three (Buryatia, Komi and Mordovia). In the 
following years, the heads of republics continue to be of the titular nationality in the republics 
with the leading role of titular elites. Similarly, the heads are of the non-titular nationality in 
the republics with the leading role of the Russian elite and the Russian majority. By summer 
2015, the heads of Mari El, Mordovia, Altay and Khakassia were ethnic Russians, the head of 
Buryatia was an ethnic Udmurt, the heads of Komi and Udmurtia were of a mixed origin, and 
the head of Karelia was of an Ingrian Finnish origin.  
The correlation of the ethnicity of a head of republic with the prevalence of the 
corresponding elite segment is an interesting empirical finding that contributes to the argument 
about the relevance of ethnicity. Of course, there are too many variables behind appointing an 
individual to this position, and no unidimensional relation can be established.   
As the cleavage structure theory predicts, complementary ethno-religious cleavages 
correlated with the patterns of prevalence of one group over the other(s) in the republics. The 
religious cleavage was present in case of the republics with Muslim titular groups. The most 
contrasting example is the Volga-Ural republics, among which three were in control of their 
Muslim titular groups and in three Finno-Ugric republics power was controlled by the regional 
Russian elites.  
Geographical location of the republics partly corresponds with the prevalence of the 
titular or Russian elites and reinforces the pattern of ethno-religious cleavages with the 
concentration of diversity in certain areas. The Russian elites dominate in the Finno-Ugric 
republics of the Volga-Ural Region and the European North, titular elites dominated in most 
republics of the North Caucasus, the regional Russian elites were included in the ruling groups 
of the Turkic republics of the Volga-Ural Region, while the republic of Siberia and the Far East 
have a mixed record.  
Types of ethnic and social stratification are measured on the scale between segmentation 
and social cohesion along such parameters as the correlation between social status, ethnicity, 
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faith, language and inter-ethnic marriage. Socio-economic inequalities reinforce ethnic 
cleavages. Among the parameters, I took the level of urbanization as an indicator of ethnic and 
social stratification. Overlapping ethnic differentiation and social stratification between urban 
and rural dwellers was characteristic of the republics with titular groups concentrated in rural 
areas, as in the Finno-Ugric republics. Cross-cutting social and ethnic cleavages were in place 
in the republics with significant presence of titular groups also in urban areas, in particular, in 
the capital city, as in the Volga Turkic republics. The prevalence of elites correlated with the 
level of urbanization of respective groups. 
The titular elites kept the leading role among the elites in the Muslim republics even being 
in the numerical minority. Indicating the significance of religion, McGarry notes that ethno-
religious minorities are less likely to be the object of an assimilationist policy than 
ethnolinguistic minorities (McGarry, 2010: 39-40). However, Russia’s regular (‘non-ethnic’) 
regions subjected to assimilationist policies all groups. For example, Golosov has demonstrated 
that in such regions the Muslim minority groups were typically side-lined from regional power 
coalitions (Golosov, 2012).  
 
2.2 Domination 
The ethnic composition of population influenced in such a way that the elite of the group in the 
numerical majority was likely to dictate the rules of consolidation. At the same time, even if 
the elite of the largest group tended to be overrepresented among the ruling groups in most 
republics, the regimes ended up having different approaches.  
The republics with populations that had one ethnic group in the firm numerical majority 
tended to produce an ethnic domination. John McGarry defines domination as ‘a hierarchy of 
privilege in a political system, where one group can exert power over another, stamping its 
culture and authority on the collective life of the state’ (McGarry, 2010: 36). Depending on 
whether the goal of domination is the preservation of ethnic divisions or their elimination, either 
the strategies of control or assimilation are pursued.  
It is meaningful to distinguish between absolute domination and domination relative to 
other groups. Exclusion has not been found even in the five republics where the share of the 
largest groups and their elites is more than 75%. The titular elites in Chechnya, Ingushetia and 
Tuva, but also the Russian elites in Khakassia and Karelia (and the autonomous districts), are 
dominant already due to the fact that the titular groups make up an absolute majority of more 
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than 82% in the total populations. Despite this, the other groups are typically included and 
ethnic Russians also significantly overrepresented mainly at the expense of other minority 
groups.  
For example, the Russian elites enjoyed a much higher rate of representation due to 
positive discrimination in Chechnya and Ingushetia with their nearly monoethnic populations. 
Ingushetia introduced an official quota for three ethnic Russian deputies in the regional 
assembly, although in reality there is only one (Kosikov, 2012: 175-176, 282). The willingness 
of authorities to promote ethnic Russians might be attributed, among other things, to the 
marginal character of such representation that does not challenge in any way the domination of 
the titular nations and rather serves symbolic purposes and prevents accusations of 
discrimination. Ethnic Russians in Tuva are included in the ruling group by the number that is 
higher by half than their population share, perhaps not least due to their higher education rates. 
This gives ground to assess the case as staying at the margin with inclusion. Nevertheless, ethnic 
Tuvinians still make up three fourths of the ruling group and clearly dominate in the republic. 
The opposite is true for Karelia and Khakassia, where the shares of titular parliamentarians in 
regional assemblies are higher than in the population, but still marginal. The case of Crimea 
annexed in 2014 is not discussed in this paper, but it would also fall into this category, with the 
difference that far less Crimean Tatars seem to be represented in the ruling group than their 
share in the population of 12%.  
It is the domination in relation to other groups that usually draws attention due to 
significant overrepresentation of one group. In three other cases of domination, by the titular 
elite in North Ossetia as well as by the regional Russian elites in Udmurtia and Mari El, the 
relation of sizes of the largest groups varies from more than three times in North Ossetia, more 
than two times in Udmurtia and to a minimal difference in Mari El. Neither has significant third 
groups nor significant religious divides. In fact, common religion enhances social cohesion not 
only drawing together Ossetians and Russians, who are Orthodox groups among many Muslim 
groups of the North Caucasus, but also contributes to the domination of the Ossetians in the 
republic. A cross-cutting social cleavage that contributes to overrepresentation of Ossetians is 
their high level of urbanization. Ossetians outnumber Russians three to one in the republic, 
which is close to absolute domination, and the shares of the groups among inhabitants of the 
capital city roughly reflects their shares in the population.   
There is no disaggregated data across the whole matrix of the republics separately on the 
legislature and the administration. However, some conclusions could be made on the basis of 
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the available data for some republics. An analysis of representation across the authority 
branches provides a key for understanding why Udmurtia and Mari El ended up in domination, 
how its mechanisms differ and whether any regularities can be noticed. If in the early 1990s the 
share of deputies of the titular nationality was nearly proportional or sometimes 
overrepresented, then by the early 2000s it has dramatically decreased to a level significantly 
below proportional. The parliamentary representation became somewhat more balanced after 
2010, apparently as an indirect effect of the state-wide centralization policy. 
In the republics where the level of ethnic mobilization in the early 1990s was rather low 
titular elites were often forced to seek a compromise with the Russian elites (for details, see 
Zamyatin, 2015: 383-384). As a result of consensual culture, the share of titular elites among 
government officials has decreased somewhat less from its peak at the time of sovereignization. 
For example, despite the domination of the Russian elite, the regime in Udmurtia continues to 
practise co-optation of titular elite, which is a feature of inclusion. Having low chances of 
becoming a significant political force itself, the titular elite chose the strategy of co-operation 
with different other elite segments. Accordingly, whatever political actor dominates, the titular 
elite retains access to some minister portfolios. The higher representation in administration than 
in parliament is also less discernible due to the group’s lower share in this republic in 
comparison with the two others.  
A situation of nearly equally sized groups produced a conflict in Mari El because of the 
opposite dynamics. The titular elite perceived itself sufficiently strong to present as a separate 
political source and entered into a confrontation for power. A long period during the 1990s of 
power-sharing ended after their loss in 2000. Since the 2000s, a drastic decrease in the share of 
the titular elite turned into the domination of the Russian elite. The titular representation in 
parliament dropped from about a half in 1995 down to 28% in 2009-2014 and further to about 
21% since, or twice less than the group’s popular share. Most outstandingly, only one to three 
ministers of the titular nationality used to be in government. Thus, one element of domination 
is symbolic inclusion as co-optation for the purpose of control of collaborating segments of 
ethnic elites (Zamyatin, 2015: 383-384).  
The domination is concentrated in executive authorities. This executive 
underrepresentation is often not immediately evident due to a counterbalancing weight of the 
share of municipal elites in the aggregated data. In the republics with the titular minority 
conjoined with vertical ethnic stratification, the share of titular elites among municipal elites is 
usually higher than among the ruling groups in general, which the available data witnesses, for 
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example, for Mari El (Zamyatin, 2015: 360-362) and can be attributed to their majority in rural 
areas. However, as noted above, municipalities are built in the ‘vertical of power’ and municipal 
overrepresentation does not compensate for executive underrepresentation.  
One possible explanation for the different patterns of parliamentarian and administrative 
representation might lie in the fashion of their formation. Significant efforts and resources that 
are accessible primarily to the dominant groups were needed to ensure public support for 
candidates to regional assemblies. At the same time, ethnic pressure groups were able to 
negotiate and bargain among other segments of the regional elites that translated into 
governmental posts also for non-dominant groups.  
While the analysis of representation across power branches provided some insight on the 
patterns of overrepresentation amounting to domination, the diversity of these cases means that 
neither the relation of sizes nor presence of third groups played a decisive role in republics. The 
relation of sizes might still have played its role in that the overrepresentation of the dominant 
group is more extended in the situation when comparable shares of the groups tend to increase 
grievances among their elites, as in Mari El. Further, overlapping ethnic differentiation and 
social inequality resulted in the Russian regional domination in Udmurtia and Mari El. 
Representation in executive authorities that are directly controlled by the head of republic is 
more flexible and, thus, illustrious of the regime. Furthermore, disproportion tends to multiply 
at the lower stories of the government due to the practice that new ministers tend to come with 
their team based, inter alia, on ethnic networks which is one of the principles for forming 
clienteles. 
 
2.3 Inclusion 
While the absence of the republics practising exclusion was a rather expected outcome, a 
relatively small number of republics with inclusion is an outcome that deserves attention. This 
should not be the result of a random scale of intervals in the model: if we shift the agreed margin 
between the modes of power-sharing and inclusion from 25% to 20%, the redistribution of 
republics in boxes will requalify only two cases, Karachay-Cherkessia and Buryatia. A shift of 
the margin between inclusion and domination from 50% to 55% will again requalify only two 
cases, North Ossetia and Mari El. 
The distinction between descriptive and substantial representation is helpful for analysis 
of the ‘weak’ forms of inclusion on its margin with regional Russian domination. As the core 
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of the linguistic and cultural demands of titular elites is support for their language and culture, 
minority elites are usually given portfolios of the ministers of culture and education, which 
resembles ‘cultural self-government’ as an element of power-sharing (O’Leary, 2008: 54-55). 
Thus, one indicator of substantial representation is the institutionalization in law of some 
additional modes of language teaching in the school curriculum, such as compulsory study of 
titular language for all students, as in Komi, or native language of instruction, as in Mordovia, 
which are not enforced, for example, in Udmurtia or Mari El. This indicator is not relevant for 
the regional Russian populations in the numerical minority because the educational framework 
is the same for the whole country and, at least in theory, they are provided with full access to 
public services in Russian.  
On the margin with titular domination are the cases of Chuvashia and Tatarstan. The 
titular group is larger by more than in two times in Chuvashia and by less than one third in 
Tatarstan. In Chuvashia, the titular group and Russians are Orthodox. In 1998, 67% of 
parliamentarians were Chuvash, 23% were Russians and 7% were Tatars (Shabunin, 2003). In 
2011, 74% parliamentarians were Chuvashs, 23% were Russians and 2% were Tatars; in 2015, 
19 members of government were Chuvash and two were ethnic Russians (my calculation). 
A decades-long relative domination of the titular group in Tatarstan should be attributed 
to a legacy of sovereignization that produced an exceptional political status of Tatarstan and 
special relations with the centre. Further, the co-existence of Islam and Orthodoxy reinforces 
the religious cleavage between the Tatars and the Russians. In 1999, 75% of the 
parliamentarians were ethnic Tatars down to 66% ten years later (Drobizheva, 2003; Tishkov 
and Stepanov 2013b). Salagaev and Sergeev (2013) reported that still in 2010-2012 there were 
only two ethnic Russians among twenty-nine government members. However, in the following 
years the number of ethnic Russian government members in the republic doubled (after the 
2015 elections, it increased to seven). Therefore, since the change in leadership in 2010, the 
representation of ethnic Russians in Tatarstan increased both in the parliament and the 
government, although it is still below the proportional level. Their noticeable under-
representation qualifies the case of Tatarstan as that of inclusion. 
To be sure, the ethnic composition with the majority of a group in the total population 
does not always determine also the prevalence of its elite. Adygea and Bashkortostan, which 
qualify as cases of inclusion, are the republics where the titular elites preserved the leading role 
in the ruling group coupled with the Russian plurality in the population. These republics were 
among those that established titular domination due to a high level of popular ethnic 
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mobilization. The overrepresentation was somewhat ambiguously called ‘ethnization’ of the 
political elites (Galliamov, 2006), as if the dominating elites, be it by titular or Russian elites, 
were not ‘ethnicized’ by default.  
In Bashkortostan, the titular group comprised less than a third of the total population, but 
for a long time dominated in the ruling group. In 1999 about 49% of parliamentarians (43.7% 
in the lower chamber and 55% in the upper chamber) and 60% of government members were 
of the titular nationality, while, accordingly, 23% and 14% were ethnic Russians (Galliamov, 
2006). Since 2008, the number of the titular parliamentarians decreased to 45%, while the 
number of Russians increased to 32% and Tatars to 27% (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2013b: 40). 
In 2015, according to my analysis, among thirty-eight government members, twenty-one were 
Bashkirs and twelve were Russians. By nearly proportional ethnic Russian representation, the 
titular elite was still overrepresented at the expense of the Tatars and other groups. Thus, 
Bashkortostan’s elite structure is characterized by inclusion of the ethnic Russians and 
domination over the Tatar-speaking community. Thus, approaches towards different groups 
could vary within the same republic, whereas the third non-titular groups were often under 
domination. 
How was ethnic domination still possible, if the group in the numerical majority could 
just outvote the dominant group? Grigorii Golosov’s observation about the case of Adygea is 
interesting for revealing the role of party politics as an electoral mechanism of domination. 
According to him, titular elites were overrepresented in the party lists not only of United Russia 
but also of the other parties, for example, in the 2006 elections (Golosov, 2012: 101, 104). 
Minority candidates were typically included both in party electoral lists and in rural minority-
majority single-mandate districts (Zamyatin, 2015). 
Golosov attributes such tactics of the inclusion of candidates of different ethnic identities 
to the strategy of non-politicization of ethnic cleavages, when the dominant elite prevents 
raising ethnic issues on the political agenda. The opposite strategy of politicization of ethnic 
cleavages could also be observed, even if usually ineffective. ‘Congresses of the (titular) 
peoples’, ethnic Russian nationalist organizations and other organizations of non-dominant 
elites sought to raise ethnic issues. For example, the Union of Slavs of Adygea entered into 
conflict with the republic’s authorities (Golosov, 2012: 101). The strategy of politicization of 
ethnicity and accompanying conflicts were also typical in the case of third titular groups, such 
as Circassians, Balkars, Tatars in Bashkortostan or, among less known cases, Erzya in 
Mordovia. 
JEMIE Vol 16, No 3, 2017 
 
47 
 
Proportional systems are said to ensure some representation of dispersed minority groups, 
but these are single-mandate districts that favour better representation of territorially 
concentrated minorities, especially those in ethnic regions (Moser, 2013). Contrary to this logic, 
proportional representation under the conditions of ‘electoral authoritarianism’ ensured a higher 
level of titular representation, because it was easier in a centralized manner to include titular 
candidates in party lists. 
Therefore, when the titular elite was sufficiently consolidated to exclude other centres of 
influence by controlling political institutions and the major parties, it for a long period 
succeeded in keeping the domination. In this context, inclusion in the republics discussed in 
this section was not so much a strategic choice as an inability to maintain domination in the 
conflictual situation due to the demographic factor under intensified pressure from the centre 
since the early 2010s. 
 
2.4 Power-sharing 
Alternatively, especially in the situation when ethnic groups were more or less equal in size, 
practices amounted to regional power-sharing (Zamyatin, 2015). According to Lijphart, power-
sharing is possible when all major segments of society enjoy a proportional level of 
representation or at least a share of power. Lijphart lists some conditions for stability of the 
political regime based on power-sharing. In order for power-sharing to last, communities should 
enjoy segmental autonomy and their elites should realize the necessity of cooperation. At the 
same time, if there are only two major segments in a society, a dual balance of power is unstable, 
because it carries a danger of political polarization and inhibits cooperation of elites and their 
participation in a grand coalition (Lijphart, 1977: 55-61).  
Lijphart distinguished mass and elite political cultures. Elite political cultures are 
coalitional or contradictive. It is the ability of political elites to co-operate and make coalitions 
that is crucial for the success of power-sharing. Grigorii Golosov finds Lijphart’s distinction 
between coalitional or contradictive political cultures still useful for studying minority 
representation in the Russian regions. He found that, even after the regions established an 
authoritarian rule, their ethnic policies can be still either inclusive or exclusive (Golosov, 2014). 
The findings of this study support and provide new evidence for Golosov’s conclusion. 
Indeed, the data demonstrate that the presence of a sizable third group, which comprised 
a second titular group larger than 10%, or several groups, had a facilitating effect for power-
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sharing solutions. Among the republics with a significant third group, Karachay-Cherkessia and 
Kabardin-Balkaria have two titular groups. In Karachay-Cherkessia, following the informal 
practice, a Karachay holds the presidential post, a Circassian the post of the government head 
and ethnic Russians those of the vice-president and the chairman of legislature. The same 
practice was followed in Kabarin-Balkaria and Dagestan (Tishkov and Stepanov, 2013a: 45, 
53, 90-91). Dagestan is exceptional for its tradition of power shared among the ‘peoples of the 
republic’, which means the nearly proportional level of representation of the four largest groups, 
Avar, Dargin, Kumyk and Lezgin. The numerous demographically smaller groups tend to be 
somewhat underrepresented, while smaller groups are much less represented.  
Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardin-Balkaria make the core of the group of 
republics with power-sharing. A common feature of the political situation in these republics 
that contributes to the drive for power-sharing along ethnic lines is the presence of ethnic 
conflicts, that is, of those conflicts that have not taken shape of institutional or intra-elite 
confrontation and where conflict sides are categorized in terms of ethnic groups.  
In addition, the data on representation in Sakha (Yakutia) also matches the indicators of 
power-sharing, but in this republic the situation evolved from that of titular domination. The 
share of the Yakuts dropped from its peak of 73.1% in parliament and 70% in government in 
the late 1990s to, accordingly, 57.4% and 58.3% (Drobizheva, 2003; Ochirova, 2011: 141). 
Nowadays the Yakuts compose more than half of the republic’s population due to outflow of 
non-titular groups from the North. There is no single significant third group, but there are 
several small numbered indigenous peoples that are politically underrepresented.  
Mari El and Mordovia also have split titular groups, but the cleavages are not that deep. 
The leadership co-opts less powerful groups. Lijphart’s scheme helps to explain why power-
sharing proved unstable in such cases, as Mari El, where more or less equally sized groups 
entered a competition race and neither the small Hill Mari nor Tatar community provided a 
stabilizing effect. It seems the presence of non-titular groups under 10%, as the Tatar 
communities in the neighbouring Finno-Ugric republics, had no noticeable impact. At the same 
time, underrepresentation of the Tatar community with the magnitude of 25% in Bashkortostan 
provoked a conflict. Sometimes the third group sided with the titular and sometimes with the 
Russian counterparts.  
In some cases of power-sharing, in Altay, Mordovia, Komi, titular elites were only 
‘minority shareholders’, which places these republics on the margin with inclusion. In these 
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republics, titular representation in regional assemblies, even if sometimes nearly proportional, 
was low due to the demographic distribution of groups. Titular elites were, nevertheless, 
included among the ruling group in the executive branch of power. The terms of this executive 
power-sharing with regard to its ethnic aspects depended on many factors. Success of titular 
elites depended on their ability to co-operate with other segments of elites. Most of their 
demands for the establishment of ethnic institutions were not included in the elite pact. The 
Russian elites were unwilling to grant ethnic institutions, which could be used instrumentally 
by titular elites to take hold of power and engage in further ethnic mobilization. However, the 
Russian elites had to make in the process of regime consolidation at least some concessions to 
titular elites. These were framed not as institutions but as practices often connected to symbolic 
recognition. 
Finally, Kalmykia and Buryatia are the republics with the Buddhist titular groups. The 
titular group in Kalmykia is in the majority, outnumbering ethnic Russians in the republic by 
almost two times and making a proportional share among urban dwellers in the capital city. The 
case of Buryatia is at the margin of power-sharing, where the titular group was significantly 
overrepresented. Titular elite used to have the leading role in the republic, although its 
overrepresentation rather reflected a higher share of Buryats among municipal elites. In 
absolute terms, the two largest groups are represented nearly equally in parliament. However, 
in 2007 the Kremlin directly interfered and insisted on the appointment of an ‘outsider’, an 
ethnic Udmurt, to the post of the head of the republic, which was previously occupied by an 
ethnic Buryat. The appointee included many ethnic Russians in the government, which shifted 
the balance towards prevalence of the regional Russian elite.   
 
2.5 Political regime types  
Variation in economic, cultural and identity structures to some extent explains the 
representation patterns, but these are mediated though political structures. In this section, I will 
invoke another set of variables revealing the impact of regional political regimes, which 
Rostislav Turovsky defined as ‘interrelated constellations of political actors and institutions 
existing in a specific territory’. He suggested focusing in exploration of regional political 
regimes on the dichotomies of ‘autonomy-dependence’, ‘democracy-authoritarianism’, 
‘monocentric-polycentric’ and ‘consolidation-competition’ (Turovsky, 2010: 19-20). I will 
JEMIE Vol 16, No 3, 2017 
 
50 
 
pinpoint the correlation of these parameters with the patterns of ethnic representation, leaving 
testing these conjectures for a further study.  
A higher level of autonomy from the centre does not correlate with ethnic representation, 
because the latter was an outcome of regional developments and not of centre-periphery 
relations. The re-establishment of the ‘power vertical’ resulted in significant undermining of 
self-governance of all republics. Nevertheless, some politically or economically strong 
republics, for example Tatarstan and Chechnya, continue to enjoy de facto a stronger standing 
vis-a-vis the Kremlin that was expressing itself, inter alia, in continued practices of clientelism. 
Since 2010, the Kremlin’s interference in some republics directed at increase of their 
dependence sometimes also signified the end of titular domination. 
Scholars sometimes argued that ethnic republics with the dominant titular elites are 
usually more authoritarian than ‘non-ethnic’ regions (Turovsky, 2010: 22). However, the 
studies that take the number of effectively represented political parties as an indicator, by the 
absence of ethnic parties and dispersion of ethnic candidates among the parties, cannot stand 
for the interplay between ethnicity and democracy. Results of complex studies that take into 
account several indicators do not provide evidence for any significant correlation between the 
regional democracy rating and ethnic representation (Petrov and Titkov, 2013).  
Monocentrist or polycentrist regimes are defined by the separation of powers between 
branches of authorities. While the principle of power separation was undermined in all regions, 
its extent varied. In a monocentric regime, the dominant actor typically presides over a 
hierarchical structure. The hierarchy did not correlate with the patterns of ethnic representation 
in legislative and executive authorities as well as municipalities across the republics.  
The institutionalized conflicts between the ruling group and opposition, or between 
branches of power are more visible to the public than intra-elite conflicts. Yet, it is competition 
between the elite segments that characterizes the actual decision-making process. The number 
of the centres of political influence determined the level of political competition. The scenarios 
of the regime consolidation depended on consensual and conflictual regime types (Golosov, 
2014), whether the dominant actor tolerated existence of other power centres or attempted to 
eradicate them. Imposing consolidation, the dominant actor typically took into account the 
ethnic dimension and provided non-dominant elites with a share of the republican pie. Those 
ruling groups, who achieved domination through the conflict, had no incentive in sharing power 
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with the defeated elite segments. Regional power-sharing and ethnic domination as the political 
outcomes seem to have correlated with consensual and conflictual types of regimes.  
 
Conclusion 
Some scholars have pointed out the unexpectedly underwhelming role of ethnicity in post-
Soviet Russian politics (Gorenburg and Giuliano, 2012). The findings of this study point at 
ethnic representation as a relevant practice for the formation of the republics’ officialdoms 
under the authoritarian regime, which is hard to detect from the institutionalist approach. The 
regional arrangements remain the key solutions to the challenge of diversity also after the 
demise of federalism. 
What were the patterns of representation? In the early 1990s, the Soviet legacy of 
ethnically balanced appointments sustained a degree of power-sharing (Zamyatin, 2015: 355-
357). Russia ended up in an institutional design that established super-presidentialism. Notably, 
it seems to be an outcome of the similar institutional design in regions that the ethnic 
background of the head of the republic always correlated with prevalence. The institutional 
design determined scenarios of regime consolidation under authoritarian tendencies. With the 
stabilization of political institutions in the mid-1990s, the dominant elite segment in the 
republics with one group larger than other(s), titular or Russian, tended to become 
overrepresented among the ruling group. The regime consolidation often signified the 
domination and marginalization of counter-elites or at least a common prevalence of one ethnic 
group in the republic’s leadership.  
Alternatively, especially if ethnic groups were more or less equal in size and power, it 
was impossible to win with the help of ethnic mobilization of one group. In that case, imposed 
consolidation typically included co-optation of counter-elite. As a compromise, the major 
groups were likely to be provided a share of power or, at least, included in power coalitions. 
Therefore, it is remarkable that the consensual or conflictual regime types seem to have relied 
on the approaches either of domination of the titular or Russian elites or of power-sharing 
between larger ethnic segments of regional elites in most republics. The establishment of 
regional varieties of an authoritarian regime have not principally brought change in the two 
scenarios.  
Why might these patterns have emerged? In line with the institutionalist account, the 
elites were largely restricted by structural factors such as the ethnic structure of the republics. 
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While demography on its own was not a good predictor, it had significance in correlation with 
other variables. Absolute domination became a default setting due to demographic factors. 
Relative domination of titular groups was established in the conditions of their numerical 
majority in the population in correlation with their proportional or higher share among the urban 
dwellers. At that, the presence of the religious cleavage in the republics titled after the Muslim 
groups typically signified deeper ethnic divides and a lower level of intercommunal trust and 
inspired the ‘winner-takes-all’ strategy. Titular domination over the republic’s leadership, with 
some exceptions, was maintained well into the 2010s. Regional Russian domination in relation 
to titular groups was sustained under the cross-cutting ethnic-religious and social cleavages in 
the case of significant Russian majority among urban dwellers. The presence of a third group 
and ethnic conflict situations involving more than two titular groups contributed to power-
sharing especially in the three most diverse republics of the North Caucasus.  
With the curtailment of regional self-governance, it became more difficult to sustain 
regional power-sharing, because the conditions for consensual decision-making were 
undermined. Some republics drifted through conflict in the direction of domination usually of 
the regional Russian elites as, for example, in Mari El. So far, the Kremlin supported regional 
Russian domination in some republics and tolerated power-sharing arrangements in some other 
republics, expecting the regional elites to deliver votes and provide for political stability. At the 
same time, the change of republic’s chief officials under the Kremlin’s pressure invoked the 
shift from titular domination to inclusion of the regional Russian elites in a few cases, notably 
in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. In general, the mixed approach to diversity management within 
the formally retained federal framework provided flexible tools that the leadership employed 
depending on the situation in republics.  
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